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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

W. R. YOUNG, et al.,
Plaintiffs and Respondent
vs.

JOE DOE FELORNIA, et al.,
Defendants and Appellants
Case No. 7772
W. R. YOUNG, et al.,
Plaintiffs and Respondent
vs.

JOE DOE FELORNIA, et al.,
Defendants and Appellants

Brief in Opposition to Petition for Rehearing

Statement of Points Relied Upon

POINT NO.1
APPELLANTS HAVE NOT RAISED ANY NEW
QUESTIONS IN THEIR PETITION FOR REHEARING.

3
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

POINT NO. II
THE STATE COURT HAS JURISDICTION OF THIS
ACTION.

ARGUMENT
POINT NO.1
APPELLANTS HAVE NOT RAISED ANY NEW
QUESTIONS IN THEIR PETITION FOR REHEARING.
In the petition for rehearing and supporting brief, appellants set out nine points which they argue and allege justify a
rehearing of this case. It is abundantly clear from prior briefs
submitted to this Court by the appellants, however, that each
of the arguments and points raised have been previously
submitted to the Court and were considered by this Court at
the time of the decision and opinion heretofore rendered.
Specifically, the argument and point raised as No. 1 in
the petition and supporting brief for rehearing was argued as
Point No. 2 in appellants' Reply Brief. Point No. 2 of the
Brief in Support of the Application for Rehearing was argued
as Point No. 1 in appellants' Reply Brief. Appellants' Point
No. 3 relative to the Taylor Grazing Act of 1934 was specifically argued in Point No. 3t of their original brief. Point No. 4
with reference to the Enabling Act of the State of Utah was
specifically argued to the Court in Point No. 4 of appellants'
original brief. Point No. 5 with respect to defendants' and
appellants' desire to prove their claimed aboriginal rights was
argued in Point 2 of their original brief, and in Point 3 of
their Reply Brief. Points Nos. 6 and 7 are included in the
4
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entire argument made by appellants in their original and reply
briefs, and there is nothing new suggested or added in appellants' Brief in Support of Rehearing that was not argued
in the original hearing of this cause.
Appellants' Point No. 8 is not argued in any way in the
Brief on petition for Rehearing, but rather appellants state
that it is self-asserting. It has been argued heretofore in Points
Nos. 2 and 6 of the original brief. Moreover, it is clear that
the trial court and the Supreme Court did not disregard the
allegations of plaintiffs' complaint, wherein it is alleged that
the defendants are residents and citizens of San Juan County,
State of Utah. There is nothing inconsistent in such an allegation and that the defendants are bound as "treaty Indians."
Appellants do not cite any authority in support of such a
suggestion, and it is submitted that it is not the law. Point
No. 9 is nothing more than a general ·summary of all the
arguments made by the appellants in their original brief
and their Reply Brief in this case.
Since no new arguments are made by appellants and no
new points raised, and particularly inasmuch as the opinion
of this Court treats all of the questions raised by the petition
for rehearing, there is no reason for further consideration of
the matter by this Court. The petition should be denied.

POINT NO. II
THE STATE COURT HAS JURISDICTION OF THIS
ACTION.
5
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On Pages 5 and 6 of their brief, appellants apparently
take the position that the State Court did not have jurisdiction to determine the controversy between the parties involved in this lawsuit because the defendants were Indians.
It is clear from a reading of the cases cited by appellants that
none of them are in point in this case. Inasmuch as these
particular cases were not cited in appellants' prior briefs, they
are treated briefly here.
In Caesar v. Krow (Sup. Ct. Okla. 1918), 176 Pac. 927,
it was held that the state court did not have jurisdiction in an
action to recover the possession of two allotments under the
General Allotment Act, approved February 8, 1887 (24 Stat.
at L. C. 119), as amended by the Acts of February 28, 1891
(25 Stat. at L. 794, C. 383) and March 3, 1893 (27 Stat. at
L. 644, C. 209). In that statute, Congress specifically conferred
authority upon the Secretary of the Interior to ascertain heirship of Indians to whom an allotment had been made. Of
course, that case is not in point for two reasons. In the first
place it is under a specific Act of Congress conferring exclusive jurisdiction for determination of the question in dispute
upon the Secretary of the Interior; secondly, the controversy
concerns an Indian allotm~nt under a specific Act of Congress.
In the case at bar, appellants were given and expressly
declined the opportunity to prove any right to allotments as
individuals. Instead they stated to the Court, through their
counsel, that their claim was to the aboriginal possessory
rights as a band and not as individuals. This is clear from the
following colloquy between Court and Counsel at the pretrial (R. 87) :
6
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"THE COURT: For the purpose of this pretrial,
you indicated to the Court, Mr. Patterson, that these
defendants do not claim any inclosed, cultivated pieces
of ground within this area.
MR. PATTERSON: True that some of these Indians
have little garden spots which are fenced off with
brush and willows and the like, but I think that your
statement is right, generally, that is not what we are
suing for. We are suing for the right to live there
of course, but we are suing for range land.
THE COURT: You are not asking the Court to set
apart any particular· land to the Indians?
MR. PATTERSON: That is right.
THE COURT: You are claiming that these defendants have a right to this land as a Clan or a Tribe,
separate and distinct, from those that are on the reservation as a band?
MR. PATTERSON: Yes

* * * ."

The defendants moreover expressly disclaimed any right
to possession of the lands in question through any Act of
Congress. This appears at Page 97 of the record, where various
stipulations were being made between counsel:
"MR. BURTON: And that any rights or claims being asserted by defendants have not been recognized
by any act of Congress?
MR. PATTERSON: Yes."
An allomtent theory, of course, would be based upon a
Congressional Act authorizing or creating the allotment. Defendants made no such claim either at the pretrial or in any
pleading filed in this action.
7
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In United States v. Kagema, et al. (1885), 118 U.S. 375,
30 L. Ed. 228, the question presented was whether the United
States had jurisdiction of a murder committed upon an Indian
reservation situated wholly within the State of California. The
Court held that as long as the Indian maintained the tribal
relationship on the reservation, no allegiance was owed to a
state, and the state gave the Indian no protection. A crime
committed upon the reservation was subject to the exclusive
jurisdiction of the United States. Of course, this principle of
law is uncontroverted and it is not involved in any manner or
respect in the case at bar. None of the Indians involved here
are on a reservation, nor are the acts of trespass complained
of upon a reservation. In fact, the controversy here arose
because of defendants' failure to stay on the reservation.
McKay v. Kalyton (1906), 204 U.S. 458, 51 L. Ed. 566,
cited by appellants at Page7, involves a controversy with
respect to the right to possession of an Indian allotment while
it was held in trust by the United States under the provision
of the Act of August 15, 1894 (24 Stat. at L. 286, C. 290),
which vested exclusive jurisdiction in the Federal Court of
questions concerning allotments under the Act. Of course,
the Court held that the State Court had no jurisdiction of such
a controversy, but, as heretofore pointed out, the right to the
possession of anallotment is not involved in this proceeding.
Minnesota v. Hitchcock ( 1901), 185 U. S. 372, 46 L. Ed.
954, cited by appellants at Page 7, involved the right of the
State of Minnesota to bring an action originally in the United
States Supreme Court. The case involved lands known as the
"Red Lake Indian Reservation." The Court held that the land
8
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was in fact an Indian Reservation, and the State of Minnesota
received no interest therein.
In the cases of Patalla v. United States (Cir. Ct. Dist. of
Ore., 1904), 132 F. 893, and Parr z1. United States (Cir. Ct.
Dist. of Ore., 1904), 132 F. 104, involve a right to lands subject
to the Act of August 15, 1984 (28 Stat. 305), in which the
Circut Court was given exclusive jurisdiction. The action in
each case was by Indians to recover allotted lands. Of course,
there can be no controversy that under these conditions the Circuit Court had exclusive original jurisdiction, but the difficulty
with appellants' position in the case at bar with respect to these
cases is that appellants do not make any claim by reason of
allotments. They reject their right to stand on any allotment
theory, and they do not have any standing in court by reason
of allotment claims. The cases are certainly not in point for
the proposition contended for by appellants in their brief.
An Indian who is not physically upon an Indian Reservation is subject to the laws of the state or territory in which
he finds himself to the same extent that a non-Indian citizen
or alien would be subject to these laws. Hunt v. State, 4 Kan.
60 ( 1866), murder of an Indian by another Indian; In re
Woolf, 27 F. 606, 610 (D. C. W. D. Ark.), conspiracy by
Indians to obtain money by false prentenses from an Indian
nation in the District of Columbia; State v. Williams, 43 Pac.
15 (Sup. Ct. of Wash., 1895), murder of Indian by Indian
outside of an Indian reservation; Pablo v. People, 23 Colo.
134, 46 Pac. 636 ( 1896), murder of Indian by another Indian
outside the reservation; State v. Spotted Hawk, 22 Mont. 33,
55 Pac. 1026 ( 1899), murder of a white man by an Indian;

9
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State v. Little Whirlwind, 22 Mont. 425, 56 Pac. 820 (1899),
murder of a white man by an Indian; Ex Parte Moore, 28 S.D.
339, 133 N. W. 817 ( 1911), murder of an Indian by another
Indian on a public domain allotment, commented on in Annotated Cases 1914B, 648, 652.
Except with respect to questions involving tribal relations as such, or the Federal Government as such, an Indian
has the same status to sue and be sued in state courts as any
other citizen. Felix v. Patrick, 145 U. S. 317, 332, 36 L. Ed.
719, 726 (1892). In Ke-Tuc-e-Mun-Guah v. McClure, 122
Ind. 541, 23 N. E. 1080 ( 1890), it was held that a suit could
not be maintained against an Indian on a promissory note
in a State Court. In Stacy v. LaBelle, 99 Wis. 520, 75 N. W.
60 ( 1898), it was held that suit could be maintained against
an Indian in a State Court on a contract. In Missouri-Pacific
R. R. Co. v. Cullers, 81 Tex. 382, 17 S. W. 19 ( 1891), a cause
of action was owned by an Indian against the railroad company
and his rights were assigned. The assignee was held to have
the right to maintain the action against the railroad company.
In discussing the various incidents of Federal and State
jurisdiction over Indians, Cohen summarizes the cases and
the principles announced therein as follows (Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law, P. 121):

" ( 1) In matters involving only Indians on an Indian
reservation, the State has no jurisdiction in the absence
of specific legislation by Congress.· ( 2) In all other
cases, the State has jurisdiction unless there is involved
a subject matter of special Federal concern."
At Page 9 of appellants' brief in support for their Peti10
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tion for Rehearing, counsel urges-apparently as a final, lastditch argument-that the State Court does not have jurisdiction because it allegedly could not enforce its decree. This was
the basis for the refusal of the United States District Court
in a similar case. United States v. Hosteen Tse-kesi, et al.
(U. S. District Court Dist. of Utah, 1950), 93 Fed. Sup. 745.
The Tenth Circuit Court expressly reversed the district judge
on this point, however. The Court said:
"While there may be cases where the court would be
justified in refusing to exercise jurisdiction, ordinarily
it is under a duty to decide cases upon their merits
and may not arbirtraily refuse to exercise its jurisdiction when invoked by appropriate proceedings. As
Chief Justice Marshall said in an early case, 'With
whatever doubts, with whatever difficulties, a case
may be attended, we must decide it if it be brought
before us.' * * *
"Injunctive relief for continued and repeated trespasses should not be denied because it is thought that
such an injunction will not be obeyed and that it would
be difficult to enforce. We think the court should assume that its orders and decrees will be promptly
obeyed by litigants rather than assuming they would
be disobeyed. We find nothing in the record which
would indicate that the defendants intended to defy
an adverse ruling of the court. * * *
"The fact that the court had no power to provide
another place for the defendants to live, whereas the
United States had such power, was not an adequate
or legal ground for denying the relief. The defendants
were charged with being wilful and continous trespassers upon the lands of the United States. If this
charge was proved to the satisfaction of the Court
an injunction should issue. Where the trespassers might
11
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reside after the injunction issues cannot be determined
in this action." (191 Fed. (2d) 519, at 520).
It does not appear to be unduly charitable to presume that

the defendants in this case will obey the order of the District
Court upon final determination of this litigation. In the
event, however, that defendants fail to abide the decision in
a lawful manner, the District Court has already made evident
that it has the ingenuity and power to effectively cope with
a violation of its decree. Certainly, as was stated by the Circuit
Court of Appeals, it would be unwarranted under the circumstances of this case for a trial court having jurisdiction of
the subject matter to refuse to exercise its powers because it
was intimidated by defendants' counsel that defendants might
not choose to abide by its decree.

CONCLUSION
The defendants and appellants in this action admittedly
make no claim to the land in question as though the land was
a part of an Indian reservation (R. 97). Defendants have
likewise expressly relinquished any claim to specific enclosed
land on the theory that defendants have some allotments (R.
87). It is therefore apparent that trespass of the land in question, whether by Indians or by any other persons, is subject
to the jurisdiction of the State Court. No question has been
raised by the defendants as to the right of plaintiffs to maintain this action. Defendants concede that the plaintiffs have
sufficient interest to maintain an action to enjoin repeated
trespass.
12
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The parties being before the Court and the subject
matter being within the power of the Court, it follows that
the Court was not only within its power but it was exercising
the duties of its office in rendering the decision in this case. The
appellants have raised no new issues in asking for a rehearing,
but on the contrary all of the issues discussed in their Petition
and Brief were decided upon the record and arguments before
this Court at the time of the decision of May 21, 1952.
The suggestion made in the petition that the State Court
does not have jurisdiction of the action is absolutely unsupported by the authorities and is contrary to law. The petition for
rehearing should be denied.
Respectfully submitted
McKAY, BURTON, McMILLAN
and RICHARDS,
720 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Respondents
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